Abstract. To design regulatory policies, agencies depend on information from the industries they are tasked to regulate. Therefore, agencies can organize consultations with the aim of obtaining information from different perspectives. This article focuses on stakeholder diversity in agency public consultations. We ask to what extent is information provided by stakeholders other than the regulated sector, such as other business interests, experts or non-business interests? Stakeholder diversity is relevant as it may prevent agencies to become exposed to one-sided information and capture by specialized interests. Are there consultation design factors that foster consultation diversity? Or, is (a lack of) consultation diversity structurally shaped by the context in which an agency operates? Analyzing a wide range of public consultations organized by European Union regulatory agencies indicates that most information agencies receive via consultations comes from regulated interests and that the limited participation of non-regulated interests is highly tenacious.
Introduction
In 2010, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) voiced their concerns about the intensive lobbying of the financial sector on financial regulation and the lack of countermobilization from civil society, followed by a call to establish Finance Watch, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that seeks to develop "counter-expertise" and promote "the public interest in financial regulation" (2010, 1) . The MEPs explicitly stated that in se they saw no harm in the financial sector expressing its interests and supplying information to regulators, but the asymmetry in lobbying activity and the lack of expertise coming from stakeholders other than the financial sector, would pose "a danger to democracy" (Finance Watch 2010, 1) .
Over the past two decades, European Union (EU) regulatory policies have increasingly been delegated to independent agencies, covering a wide array of domains ranging from financial regulation to aviation safety and the authorization of pharmaceuticals.
1 EU regulatory agencies actively reach out to non-state stakeholders -such as industry associations, NGOs and trade unions -to fulfill their informational needs regarding the sectors they are supposed to regulate. In general, regulators need information to identify market failures, design measures that address these failures and assess the probable consequences of the proposed regulatory measures (e.g. Coglianese et al. 2004 ). This need for information makes regulators highly dependent on the industries directly targeted by regulations, given their information advantage resulting from their central position within a particular field (Kwak 2014; Pagliari and Young 2016) .
While information from regulated industries can lead to more effective regulatory outcomes and a smoother implementation process, regulated industries also have an incentive to gather and supply information that serves their interests, rather than the general interest (Braun 2013; Coglianese et al. 2004; Kwak 2014) . Agency capture is expected to be especially high when regulators receive "strong, loud and united messages" from regulated industries, and countervailing forces, such as NGOs or labor unions, are hardly mobilized or even completely absent (McKay and Yackee 2007, 349; Yackee and Yackee 2006) . Therefore, diversity in policymakers' sources of information is important, for instance to gather information on negative externalities or hazards associated with products or production processes. As Baumgartner and
Jones have stated, "information should come from as many angles as possible" when it comes to identifying and addressing complex policy problems (2015, 6) .
Policymakers deliberately design consultation procedures with the aim of diversifying the set of stakeholders from whom they receive information (Borrás et al., 2007) . Public consultations are considered a useful tool to gather information from a diverse set of stakeholders. Given the low threshold and relatively low costs to participate, compared with face-to-face meetings with policymakers, public consultations have been promoted by the European Commission (EC) as a tool to foster the participation of non-business groups such as environmental NGOs, consumer groups and labor interests (Bunea, 2017; Klüver, 2012; Quittkat, 2011 ; for the United States -US hereafter -see for instance Furlong & Kerwin, 2005; Yackee, 2006 Yackee, /2013 .
This article focuses on stakeholder diversity in EU agencies' public consultations and aims to answer the following research question: To what extent do consultations enable the participation of a diverse set of stakeholders? And what explains the diversity of stakeholder mobilization across a large set of consultations? While most research on EU agencies looks at agency autonomy, the establishment of agencies and how agencies relate to their political principals, few scholars have systematically investigated how agencies interact with stakeholders (Egeberg and Trondal 2017; Rittberger and Wonka 2011) . Moreover, existing studies focus on only one or two policy domains, limiting generalizability (Borrás et al. 2007; Thiel 2014; Chalmers 2015) . The cross-sectional approach of this paper allows for generalization across policy domains, ranging from the regulation of chemicals to pharmaceuticals and aviation safety.
To answer the research questions, we analyze a novel dataset including 2,677 stakeholders participating in 358 public consultations organized by EU agencies. Our analyses lead to several conclusions. First, stakeholder participation in EU agency consultations is largely a matter of business representation, as most information agencies receive via these consultations comes from stakeholders representing regulated industries. Second, legal rules on stakeholder involvement have a conditional impact on the mobilization of non-regulated interests. Third, despite the overall dominance of business interests, agencies have some leeway to design consultations in a way that non-regulated interests are more inclined to participate, for instance by consulting at the early stage of the policy process.
Explaining stakeholder diversity in public consultations
To understand why regulators depend for their informational needs on the industries they are supposed to regulate, and how stakeholder diversity can mitigate capture, it is important to appreciate one rationale of government regulation, namely addressing market failures and negative externalities. 2 To identify when and why externalities or market failures occur, and to design possible interventions and assess the potential consequences of these interventions, regulators need information about the activities of, and costs and benefits for, individuals and firms (Coglianese et al. 2004; Mattli and Woods 2009) . Once regulators have identified market failures, negative externalities or product hazards, they need to consider regulatory remedies and gather information about the possible consequences of their policies. Such information includes compliance costs for companies and the extent to which new regulations would impact public health, but also information on potential unintended side effects (Coglianese et al., 2004 ). An EU agency official has described their motivation to involve stakeholders as follows:
" In short, stakeholder involvement is linked to legitimacy, as it could lead to higher quality policy outputs and may improve accountability (Borrás et al. 2007 ). First, stakeholder participation is expected to lead to better outputs, as the insights and information stakeholders supply stimulate deliberation and improve the problem-solving capacity of agencies. On the one hand, stakeholders provide technical and scientific information which may lead to better, expertise-based decisions.
On the other hand, as stakeholders press for transparency from the side of the agencies, the deliberative qualities of agencies are expected to increase as well (Agné et al. 2015) . Second, involving stakeholders can raise accountability, as a large and diverse set of stakeholders may monitor the agencies and bring new information into the public debate. This is what principal agency theorists have labeled as "fire alarm oversight"; civil society can push agencies to adopt more transparent and open policymaking procedures and to publicize information on their decisions (Arras and Braun 2018; Kelemen 2002; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) . The disclosure of such information makes it easier for both principals and the public to hold agencies accountable.
Although the reasons for regulatory interventions are multifarious, often the costs of regulations are concentrated among a selected set of companies in a particular field, while the benefits are diffusely spread among all citizens or a broader range of industries. For instance, the regulatory costs of addressing the negative externalities of specific economic activities (e.g. pollution) are often borne by specific industries (e.g. the chemical industry), while the benefits are of a more diffuse nature (e.g. cleaner air). Therefore, regulated industries' need and readiness to develop expertise, lobby and participate in consultations are substantial. Organizations representing these industries also have an information advantage that stems from their acquaintanceship with companies that acquire expertise as a by-product of their everyday economic activities (Barkow 2010; Bouwen 2002; Pagliari and Young 2014) . Moreover, these regulated industries have an incentive to provide policymakers with self-serving information (Coglianese et al. 2004; Mattli and Woods 2009) . Hence, while the agencies' usage of information supplied by regulated industries may lead to more effective regulation and a smoother implementation process, it could lead to capture, namely policies systematically favoring regulated industries to the disadvantage of the general interest (Carpenter 2001 (Carpenter /2010 Carpenter and Moss 2014; Kwak 2014; West and Raso 2013) . For instance, manufacturers gather information about the costs of producing a specific product, such as labor costs, but will focus less on the environmental burdens of their activities. Even if they are aware of environmental costs, they might be tempted to withhold this information (Coglianese et al. 2004) . As Schlozman and Tierney have put it: "A policymaker who hears from only one side -or who hears much more from one side than the other -is likely to be persuaded by the arguments and information to which he or she is exposed" (1986 ( , 165, cited in Furlong, 1997 . This proposition also follows from resource dependence theory, which states that organizations are likely to be influenced by those who control the resources they need (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) .
For other stakeholders, such as consumers, or business interests that are not part of the regulated sector but might be indirectly affected by regulation, it is costlier to acquire sufficient expertise, and thus to participate in consultations (Broscheid and Coen 2007; Pagliari and Young 2016) . This is especially the case for those stakeholders representing non-business interests such as labor, consumer concerns and groups advocating on behalf of environmental causes. Many studies indeed demonstrate that business groups and citizens' groups are unequally endowed with political and technical resources. Furthermore, the former are better able to mobilize resources over a prolonged period of time, are more actively involved in public consultations, and gain better access to policymakers (e.g. Dür and Mateo 2016; Eising 2007 To prevent capture, it might be helpful for regulators to be exposed to information from different sources (Braun 2012; Coglianese et al. 2014; Pagliari and Young 2016; Yackee and Yackee 2006) . A more balanced representation -involving both regulated industries and nonregulated interests -may mitigate information asymmetries and attenuate market power by countering the dominant position of regulated industries in regulatory governance (Coglianese 1997; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Damonte et al. 2014) . First, while research on interest groups is often focused on conflict between business and non-business interests, some recent research highlights the relevance of conflict between different business interests (Pagliari and Young 2016; Young and Pagliari 2015) . For instance, while oil companies are less likely to provide policymakers with complete information about the environmental costs associated with their industry, renewable energy companies have a strong incentive to do so. A second source of information is citizen groups or NGOs, which represent public interests that are not directly related to professional activities, and advocate for policies that do not directly benefit their members or supporters (Dür and Mateo 2016; Pagliari and Young 2016 (Berkhout et al. 2018; Klüver 2012; Quittkat 2011; Quittkat and Kotzian 2011; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014) . These studies usually do not make a distinction between regulatees and other business interests. While the underlying logic of public consultations is to provide interested stakeholders the opportunity to voice feedback on proposed rules, several studies indicate that business interests systematically make up the largest share of commenters and are more successful in attaining their preferred outcomes (Furlong and Kerwin 2005; Yackee 2006; Yackee 2013; Yackee and Yackee 2006; West and Raso 2013; Quittkat 2011; Quittkatt and Kotzian 2013; Rasmussen and Caroll 2015) .
Hypotheses
This article analyses stakeholder diversity, more precisely the extent to which stakeholders other than the regulated sector participate and provide information in public consultations organized by EU agencies. Second, EU agencies are key players in the implementation phase of regulations, in other words, the final stage of the regulatory cycle. They draft implementing rules which specify the application of a regulation, an important task since EU regulations are often rather broadly formulated as a result of compromises between the EU member states (Coen and Thatcher 2008) .
The Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), for instance, consulted stakeholders on draft guidelines for the application of the Roaming Regulation (BEREC 2013). Countervailing forces to the regulatees are less likely to mobilize in the implementation phase, since the discussion at that point revolves around filling in the highly technical detailswhich can still have important consequences for the regulatees -but the essence of the regulation, which has been adopted in the legislative phase, will no longer change drastically. As the scope of the conflict narrows towards the implementation phase of a regulation, bias towards regulated industries will increase and stakeholder diversity will decrease (Berkhout et al. 2018; Schattschneider 1960; Yackee and Yackee 2006; West and Raso 2013) .
Another factor likely to affect whether stakeholders other than the regulatees mobilize, is the technical complexity of the issue at hand. "A highly complex issue is one that raises factual questions that cannot be answered by generalists or laypersons" (Gormley 1986 , 598, cited in Yackee 2006 . Complex issues require more expertise and knowledge from stakeholders who want to take part in consultations, and therefore, the more complex a topic, the higher the cost to participate. This makes it problematic for non-regulatees, especially non-business interests, to express their preferences ( To increase diversity in the set of stakeholders that participate, agencies can choose to put some effort into communicating in layman's terms. One official has described an agency's efforts to reach stakeholders other than the regulatees as follows: Third, the format of consultations, which agencies are free to choose, is expected to affect who participates. In particular, one consultation characteristic will impact non-regulatees' incentive to mobilize, namely the response format, or how stakeholders are asked to comment (Pagliari and Young 2016; Quittkat 2011 (Kelemen 2002; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) . For instance, previous research on EU agencies has indicated that most EU agency advisory committees are legally required by the founding regulation to involve stakeholders other than the regulated sector, and several EU agencies' legal statutes also contain requirements regarding such involvement (Arras and Braun 2018; Pérez Durán 2018) . Agencies that have such legal requirements will invest more in contacts with non-regulated interests. As they are expected to reach out to non-regulated interests or at least keep them informed, they therefore also attract a more diverse set of consultation participants.
Second, several agencies have established advisory committees in which stakeholders are represented. These committees are permanent bodies providing agencies with advice on various regulatory issues. Agencies have some leeway in how these committees are established. Some committees are more diverse -for instance in terms of the non-business interests involvedcompared to other committees (Arras and Beyers 2019) . Many studies have demonstrated that mobilization in one arena spills over into mobilization in other arenas (Binderkrantz et al. 2015; Quittkatt and Kotzian 2011) . This leads us to hypothesize that agencies establishing consultative bodies with less diversity will exhibit less diversity among consultation participants. 4 Third, agency age indicates an agency's organizational development. Traditionally, it has been argued that over time agencies become more dependent on the regulated sector, so participation by non-regulated interests is expected to be less for more established and older agencies (Kwak 2014; Maggetti 2007; Novak 2014) . However, EU agencies are still relatively young (between 7 and 15 years), which makes it impossible to estimate their long-term institutional development. Therefore, we believe that in the short time span of these agencies' existence another mechanism is at work. More precisely, as regulated industries have more resources (see above), it is plausible to presume that they mobilize faster than non-regulated interests, implying that regulated industries mostly address recently established agencies (see also Hanegraaff 2015) . After the short period of their initial establishment, agencies will actively seek more diverse stakeholder participation and non-regulated interests will overcome their collective action problems, resulting in greater stakeholder diversity among somewhat older agencies.
In summary, we propose the following hypotheses:
H4: Agencies that are legally required to promote broad stakeholder involvement attract more non-regulated interests.
H5: If an agency advisory body demonstrates a high level of diversity, more non-regulated interests mobilize in consultations.
H6: Older agencies attract more non-regulated interests.
Research design
Of all the EU regulatory agencies operational on 1 January 2015 (N=16), those which organize public consultations were selected, resulting in ten agencies being included in the analysis (Table 1) . However, there was considerable variation in data accessibility. consultations for three types of evidence: information about the stakeholders, agency characteristics and consultation features. Table 2 gives a descriptive overview of dependent, independent, and control variables. In addition to these business interests, we identified non-business interests, which include organizational entities that do not represent companies, but which claim to speak on behalf of some general citizens' interest. These concern consumer interests, specific causes such as human rights, animal rights, environmental or health concerns, labor rights, or other general causes. More specifically, within this category we find labor unions as well as a diverse range of NGOs. It should be noted that, for the purpose of this paper, modelling the involvement of non-business interests is highly relevant because especially this actor type -compared to experts, other business interests and public authorities -lacks resources as well as expertise. We also identified a set of consultees we labeled "experts". These are representatives of professional associations, institutions such as hospitals or research institutes, and various national expert bodies. Finally, several EU-level agencies grew out of EU-wide regulatory networks consisting of national-level regulators.
National governments are key decision-makers in EU legislative processes and often national regulators take an active part in implementing EU regulations (Egeberg and Trondal 2011/2017; Bunea and Thomson 2015; Quittkat 2011 ). Hence we established a separate category for public authorities. As Table 4 (below) illustrates, national regulatory authorities mobilize in large numbers on the aviation sector and aviation safety (EASA) and medicine regulation (EMA).
Next, we have three variables at the agency level. The first two -agency age and legal provisions -were coded on the basis of official documents. With respect to legal provisions, we read the agencies' legal statutes and looked at whether agencies are explicitly expected to consult with stakeholders other than the regulated sector (for instance, consumer groups, environmental groups or patient organizations). These agencies are supposed to invest more in contacts with stakeholders outside the regulated sector by actively reaching out to them, thereby also attracting a more diverse set of consultation participants. To determine the diversity of the advisory committee, we coded all committee members in the same way that we coded all other stakeholders.
For both the advisory committees and the public consultation participants we calculated the Finally, the characteristics of the 358 public consultations were coded after reading the consultation call, that is, a short text describing what the consultation is about, and reading the attached more elaborate consultation papers or draft documents. The consultation type was coded into two main categories (see Pagliari and Young 2016) . First, implementation cases take place at the end of the regulatory process and the issue at hand deals with executing existing EU legislation via implementing decisions. Second, some consultations seek general policy advice that is not directly related to the implementation of existing legislation. This may entail advice on future legislative proposals, feedback on the agency's long-term strategy (such as a future multi-annual framework), or recommendations on the internal functioning of the agency (for instance on the agency's consultation practices).
Policy complexity is an intricate concept, both in terms of conceptualization and operationalization. Most consultation calls consist of, on the one hand, a short text announcing or preceding the consultation (called an "announcement", "executive summary", or "paper overview"), and, on the other hand, a more elaborate paper discussing the topic in more detail. For all these documents we coded the level of complexity based on a four-level scale ("very simple", "simple", "complex" and "very complex") (see Pagliari and Young 2016; Yackee 2006; Yackee and Yackee 2006) . A sample of 40 consultations was double-coded by two independent coders to test whether the scale works well; the coding of the announcement resulted in a high degree of reliability (Krippendorff's α=0.87), while establishing a reliable measure on the basis of the more extensive papers proved to be much more difficult (Krippendorff's α=0.62). The lower reliability score for the consultation papers is not entirely surprising, because such documents are more dense and often combine highly technical insights with some general information, making it more difficult to assess complexity in a reliable way.
Importantly, both measures do not cover the inherent or actual complexity of policy issues, but rather the complexity with which an agency presented the policy issue and, especially, how this might be viewed by a potential consultee. On the one hand, complexity has a subjective component in the sense that what one individual experiences as complex might be relatively simple for someone else. On the other hand, how agencies portray a specific issue cannot be entirely separated from the objective nature of the issue, so that we cannot rule out that some variation might be driven by intrinsic issue complexity. In essence, our measure seeks to separate consultations that are presented as highly specialized and technical from those where a lay-person could decipher what a particular consultation is about. It is worth taking a closer look at how these two measures correlate. To begin, as Table 3 illustrates, many consultations were coded as "complex" or "very complex". This was especially the case for consultation papers (78% are "complex" or "very complex"), but much less so for short announcements (51% are "complex" or "very complex"). Also, both measures are considerably correlated, implying that they potentially measure the same underlying construct (Chi 2 =228.30, p<.0001, df=9, Spearman's Rho=0.69). Yet, the substantial number of cases in the top right off the diagonal (30%) suggests that in drafting consultation calls, agency officials produce announcements that are perceived as less complex compared to the corresponding consultation papers. As the coding of the shorter announcement resulted in a more reliable measure, we decided to use this as our primary independent variable. However, in a small number of cases (n=6) we could not find a consultation announcement (or general overview, executive summary). In these cases, potential consultees had to depend on the, generally more complex, consultation paper when deciding on whether or not to take part in the consultation. Therefore, for the cases without a short announcement, we imputed the complexity measures of the consultation papers.
Finally, the consultation format indicates how stakeholders are asked to respond to the consultation. A consultation can be open or standardized. An open format means that the agency presents a certain issue or a draft document and asks stakeholders to provide feedback without asking specific questions. In consultations with a standardized response format, stakeholders are asked to provide answers to specific questions.
Our models include two control variables. First, we controlled for the duration of the consultation, measured as the number of days between the published call and the deadline to comment (Quittkat 2011; Røed and Wøien Hansen 2018) . Formulating and drafting a position takes time, so the longer the consultation is open, the more stakeholders are expected to participate.
Second, we controlled for the number of stakeholders (logged count variable) that present themselves in each consultation, as one might presume that the diversity of consultees, or the chance that non-regulated interests will present themselves, increases as more stakeholders take part in the consultation (Bunea and Thomson 2015; Rasmussen and Carrol 2013 ).
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Analysis
A descriptive examination of who participates in EU agency consultations (Table 4) and 11% of all participants), mostly environmental and consumer organizations.
Do these results differ from other venues, for instance within the EU? Although it goes
beyond the scope of this paper to provide a systematic comparative analysis, the available evidence suggests that non-regulated interests are especially poorly represented in agency public consultations. One way to contextualize this observation is to compare the representation of nonregulated interests in consultations with the composition of the advisory committees that EU agencies have established. The committee HHIs indicate that the diversity in these advisory committees (Table 3) , despite the strong presence of regulated interests in these bodies (Arras & Beyers, 2019) , is substantially higher (or similar) compared to the diversity of stakeholders in public consultations. Interestingly, while the number of participants in advisory committees is limited, these bodies realize a more balanced set of represented interests (Quittkat and Kotzian 2012, 412) . Moreover, while on average only 5% of the consultees in agency consultations represent non-business interests, this figure is 12% in advisory committees. There is ample research analyzing how private interests interact with the EC, for instance via open consultations organized by the EC. Compared to the results reported here, most of these studies report higher representations of non-business and citizen interests. Depending on the sample method, the study design and the policy field, and despite the strong prevalence of business groups, the share of citizen groups and non-business interests in the mobilized interest group population typically ranges between 10% and 30% (e.g. Berkhout et al. 2018; Rasmussen and Gross 2015; Rasmussen and Carrol 2013; Quittkat 2011; Quittkat and Kotzian 2012; . Table 4 suggests that the diversity of consultation participants relates to the agency organizing the consultation. Yet, this assertion does not clarify whether agency features or consultation characteristics account for this diversity. In order to analyze the diversity across consultations, we tested regression models with the consultation HHI and the proportion of nonregulated interests -the combination of other business interests, non-business interests and experts -as dependent variables (Table 5 , Parts I and II). One drawback of the HHI and the proportion of non-regulated interests is that these measures do not clarify in which actor type -experts, nonbusiness interests or other business interests -observations are concentrated. For instance, is greater diversity the result of experts taking part in the consultations or the increased mobilization of civil society groups? As an additional robustness check, we tested three separate models with the proportions of non-regulated business interests, non-business interests and experts as dependent variables (Table 5 , Part III). Because of the proportional nature of the dependent variable, we used a fractional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge 1996) . As participation patterns in one consultation may affect what happens in other consultations, we cannot presume that each consultation is an entirely independent observation, which could lead to biased standard errors and increase the risk of type I errors. Therefore we estimated robust standard errors to account for potential dependencies. Furthermore, consultations are nested within one of the nine agencies, resulting in these consultations being similar, for instance in terms of some unobserved variable such as actual policy complexity. 7 In order to accommodate the multi-level structure of the data, we estimated a random intercept for the agency level (Jones and Subramanian 2011). Looking at the control variables, consultation duration has no significant effect on nonregulated stakeholder mobilization or diversity. Controlling for the total number of mobilized interests confirms that, on average, a high mobilization density corresponds to a more diverse set of consultation participants (a lower HHI) and more non-regulated interests, especially other business and non-business interests (not experts).
The results are less straightforward when it comes to consultation-related factors. For instance, consultation format has no effect on the HHI or the proportion of non-regulated interests.
Although non-regulated interests are more active in early-stage consultations, we do not observe a significant effect on the consultation HHI. Long-term strategy consultations, for instance asking for input regarding what should be on the agency's agenda in the coming years, by comparison with implementation consultations, attract relatively more attention from non-business interests and experts (but not other business interests). The predicted proportions of non-business interests and experts decrease from 0.09 (S.E.=0.05) and 0.23 (S.E.=0.10) in early-stage consultations to 0.03 (S.E.=0.02) and 0.12 (S.E.=0.07) in late-stage consultations. These are small though significant differences, especially taking into account the small number of non-business interests.
Complexity has some impact on the consultation HHI. Table 5 , Part III illustrates that consultations announced by complexly written consultation calls decrease the relative number of non-business interests participating. Their share among the consultees decreases from 0.07 (S.E.=0.05) consultations in response to a call written in layman's terms to 0.02 (S.E.=0.01) consultations in response to highly complex calls. Yet, we should remain cautious about these results. It should be noted that the size of the effect is rather small and non-business mobilization is mostly negatively affected by "very complex" issues, not "complex" issues. This means that, even for non-business interests, mobilization is only affected to a limited extent by perceived complexity. Even if agencies were to make some effort to communicate in a more accessible language, which might be recommended, this would not have a huge impact. In order to aid interpretation, Figure 1A plots the estimated proportion of non-regulated consultees and the predicted HHI by agency. The advisory committee HHI and the agency age are presented on the x-axis. Considering the three agencies not bound by legal provisions, we can see that the mobilization of non-regulated interests is very low (estimated proportion <0.20) in cases where the advisory committee is less diverse (the ACER and the EASA), while it is much higher for the ECHA. The ECHA has a much more diverse committee and higher estimated proportion however, with its committee HHI of 0.64 and estimated proportion of non-regulated interests of 0.22, the ESMA still mobilizes a large number of non-regulated interests (compared to agencies not bound by legal provisions). Similar to agencies not bound by legal provisions, agency age positively affects the mobilization propensity of non-regulated interests and leads to more diversity among consultation participants. However, it should be noted that agencies bound by legal rules are on average younger (more precisely the EBA, the EIOPA and the ESMA), and that these more recently established agencies have a lower estimated proportion of non-regulated interests and somewhat less diverse consultations compared to older agencies (the EMA, the ERA and the EFSA).
The interaction models reported in Table 5 , Part III, largely confirm these results. Only the results for other business interests are different. Agency age does not affect the mobilization of other business interests and, looking at the estimated proportions ( Figure 1B) , it seems that older agencies attract fewer other business interests (and relatively more non-business interests and experts). Moreover, agencies bound by legal provisions attract far fewer other business interests (compared to agencies not bound by legal provisions), which is largely due to the very low mobilization of other business interests in the case of the EMA (0.06), the ERA (0.06) and the EFSA (0.08). A closer look at the estimated proportions in Figure 1B reveals another relevant result. One could ask which actor type contributes to consultation diversity. As agencies listed towards the right are more diverse, we find that diversity is largely due to an increasing number of experts and a decreasing number of other business interests (the EMA, the ERA and the EFSA).
Although diversity corresponds with an increasing number of non-business interests, the estimated share of non-business interests in the entire range of mobilized stakeholders remains very low (<0.10).
Conclusion
This article examined to what extent EU agency consultations are dominated by regulated industries or attract a more diverse set of stakeholders, and how varying participation patterns can be explained. The findings reveal that a large majority of the submissions agencies receive via public consultations come from regulated industries. Other stakeholders -non-business interests, other business interests, experts and public authorities -mobilize in much smaller numbers. Even in the most diverse consultations (HHI<0.50), 69% of consultees represent regulated industries; in only 15% of consultations do non-business interests comprise more than 10% of consultees.
Although agencies have some discretion in how they design their consultations -open or closed format, complexity, stages of the policy process -consultation design factors have only a limited impact. Consultations announced by complexly written calls somewhat reduced the proportion of non-business interests, but this effect was rather small; even the mobilization of non-business interests is affected only to a limited extent by perceived complexity.
In addition, consultations organized at the start of the policy cycle, that is, where the agency has an agenda-setting role, attract a wider range of stakeholders compared to consultations at the end of the policy cycle, that is, on implementation issues. This indicates that the implementation phase of EU regulation is fertile soil for regulated industries to mobilize, which is in line with previous research on stakeholder participation in consultations organized by US federal agencies (e.g. Mckay and Yackee 2007; Yackee and Yackee 2006; West and Raso 2013) . This finding also confirms earlier observations demonstrating a higher prevalence of non-business interests earlier in the policy process (e.g. Berkhout et al. 2018) . Nonetheless, these varying mobilization patterns
should not be equated with regulated industries having less influence during earlier stages of the policy process. Important is that our results concern relative mobilization patterns, namely compared to late-stage consultations, early-stage consultations attract relatively more non-business interests (9%), experts (18%), and other business interests (8%), which means that, in addition to public authorities (16%), a substantial number of regulated industries (48%) are still represented among the early-stage consultees.
Finally, compared to consultation design factors, contextual factors have a substantial impact. We found that legal provisions matter for consultation diversity, more precisely legal rules interact significantly with agency age and the composition of agencies' advisory committees. This corroborates earlier findings on how stakeholder participation, but also access and potential influence, is not only a matter of stakeholders' own incentives to mobilize (so-called supply-side factors), but is also shaped by the institutional setting policymakers establish for interactions with stakeholders (so-called demand-side factors) (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007; Mahoney 2004; Quittkat 2011; Van Ballaert 2017) .
Certainly, the limited number of agencies urges us to remain cautious. As EU agencies are established to regulate one particular policy field, it is difficult to draw conclusions with respect to policy field features. The opportunities for non-regulated interests to gain expertise and the extent to which knowledge is dispersed among different stakeholders are possibly influenced by policy-related variables. To regulate the banking sector, for example, regulators need information about the risks of certain financial products or a bank's assets, which is almost exclusively in the hands of banks themselves and difficult to acquire by other stakeholders. By contrast, food safety regulation requires information about the health risks of specific foods or ingredients, which can also be tested by regulators themselves, consumer organizations or independent scientists.
However, the fact that policies intersect with the institutional set-up of each agency makes it hard to separate policy characteristics from institutional features. Therefore, future research might take other agency-level or sector-specific characteristics into account, which might be useful given the substantial variation found between agencies as well as the effect of agency-level factors.
Another useful avenue for future research would involve a more direct comparative analysis between agency consultations and consultations organized by the EC or other supranational/national policymaking institutions. Analyses involving different institutions situated at multiple levels of governance would contribute to the development of a more general theoretical understanding of consultation practices. For instance, as much agency politics concerns the implementation of legal rules, we observed a high propensity of regulated business to respond to consultation calls. Therefore, it is plausible to hypothesize that the consultation practices of EU regulatory agencies are more similar to consultations organized by national-level agencies than to EC consultations.
Two limitations of this study can inspire future scholarship on stakeholder mobilization with regard to regulatory agencies. First, who participates in consultations is a subset of a larger stakeholder population with an interest in influencing the agencies (but see Berkhout et al. 2018; Rasmussen and Gross 2015; Røed and Wøien Hansen 2018 engines such as Google Trends and EurActiv produced no of just a few hits, we could safely conclude that public salience is rather low. However, a key variable, namely the number of stakeholders taking part in the public consultations, can be seen as a proxy for actor salience, namely the extent to which an issue is important for individual stakeholders . It should be noted that this measure (the number of participants in a consultation), as most other political attention measures, has a highly skewed distribution. 7 The BEREC does not have an advisory committee, and therefore this agency was not included in the regression analysis. Although the dataset has a multi-level structure, dependencies, measured by the intra-class correlation (ICC), are different for the different dependent variables (ICC for HHI=0.36, non-regulated interests=0.23, other business interests=0.17, non-business interests=0.07, and experts=0.23).
